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Abstract 
This  paper  evaluates  the  effects  of  grade  retention  on  attainment  by  exploiting  a  reform 
introduced in 2001 in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium whereby the possibility of 
grade retention in grade 7 was reintroduced. It uses the Synthetic Control Method to identify 
the  best  possible  pre-treatment  control.  Data  come  from  three  waves  of  the  PISA  study 
(corresponding  to  periods  before  and  after  the  reform)  that  contains  test  scores  of 
representative samples of 15 year-olds. These are used essentially to answer two questions. 
First, has the 2001 grade repetition reform at least succeeded at filtering out weaker pupils, 
pupils who would presumably be disadvantaged by being promoted directly to higher grades. 
This is a minimum condition for grade retention to be justifiable. Second, do these ―treated‖ 
students achieve better/worse when they repeat (and attend a lower grade) than when they are 
―socially  promoted‖  (and  attend  the  age  15  reference  grade  10)?    We  find  significant 
evidence of positive screening but  we fail to  demonstrate that those filtered out  perform 
differently under the ―grade repetition‖ regime than under the ―social promotion‖ regime.  





Grade  retention  (or  repetition)  is  the  object  of  an  ongoing  debate  in  many  developed 
countries. Some countries privilege a system of ―social promotion‖, which allows pupils to be 
promoted to higher grades independently of their performance, while other countries have 
instituted more or less strict policies of grade retention, conditioning promotion to higher 
grades on educational achievements. As a consequence, there is a considerable variation in 
grade  retention  rates
1  across  OECD  countries  (Figure  1).  Countries/entities  like  the 
Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal  and  the  French-Speaking  Community  of  Belgium  have 
relatively high rates of grade retention (going up to 50% of pupils having repeated a year or 
more by the time they reach the end of compulsory schooling); while countries like Denmark, 
Sweden, Japan, Norway and the UK have no grade retention at all. 
 
Grade retention imposes a cost on society, both in terms of the opportunity costs of those 
pupils who are forced to repeat a year, but also in terms of teaching resources. Indeed, grade 
retention  often  implies  larg er  class  sizes  and  more  pressure  on  the  (limited)  teaching 
resources. Overall pedagogues do not generally support the effectiveness of grade retention 
and the ensuing differences in the grade attended by pupils (McCoy and Reynolds, 1999). 
They  argue  that  g rade  retention  has  negative  effects  on  self -esteem  and  academic 
performance, and even on non-academic outcomes such as crime and teenage pregnancy. On 
the other hand, the proponents of grade retention argue that it may have motivational effects 
on pupils – the threat of being retained playing the role of a ―stick‖.  
 
There is a large amount of evidence showing a negative association between grade retention 
and educational outcomes. Holmes (1989), in a large meta-analysis, finds that, on average, 
later test scores of children retained in lower grades are 0.19 to 0.31 standard deviations 
lower than those of similar children progressing normally through school. The same negative 
results are reported in a subsequent meta-analysis by Jimerson (2001). There is also a large 
amount of evidence of a negative relationship between retention and high school (i.e. upper 
secondary) dropout (e.g. Grissom and Shepard, 1989; Roderick, 1994; Jimerson, 1999). The 
challenge of this literature is of course that grade retention and educational outcomes are 
                                                 
1   Defined as the share of pupils aged 15 attending a below-reference grade. 3 
 
likely  to  be  simultaneously  determined,  which  often  compromises  the  identification  of  a 
causal effect.  
 
There  are  a  few  studies  providing  quasi-experimental  evidence  on  the  effects  of  grade 
retention. Eide and Showalter (2001) use the variation in the age of entry into kindergarten 
across US  states  as  an  instrument  for retention. They  find that for white students,  grade 
retention may have some benefit by both lowering dropout rates and raising labour market 
earnings, although the IV estimates tend to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Three 
studies  (Jacob  and  Lefgren  (2004,  2009),  Roderick  and  Nagaoka  (2005))  exploit  a 
discontinuity in the retention decision under Chicago’s high-stakes testing policy
2 introduced 
in 1996-97. The policy created a discontinuity in the relation between scores in a single 
standardised test  (thereby  the label  ―high stakes‖) and the probability of grade retention. 
Using a regression discontinuity design, these studies evaluate the effects of grade retention 
on pupil performance at different points in time. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) find no systematic 
differences  in  performance  between  retained  and  promoted  students  in  the  short-run. 
Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) show that third-grade students who were retained do not yield 
higher language test scores two years after the retention, and that retained sixth graders had 
lower achievement growth. Finally, Jacob and Lefgren (2009) find that grade retention leads 
to  a  modest  increase  in  the  probability  of  dropping  out  for  older  students,  but  has  no 
significant effect on younger students. Finally, Manacorda (2008) exploits a discontinuity 
induced by a rule in Uruguay Junior High School establishing automatic grade retention for 
students missing more than 25 days and shows that grade retention leads to a substantial 
increase in drop-out and lower educational attainment even 4 or 5 years later.  
 
In this paper we exploit a reform in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium in 2001 that 
(re)introduced the possibility of grade retention at the end of both grade 7 and grade 8. Before 
then
3, grade retention was not allowed at the end of grade 7. The reintroduction of grade 
retention in 2001 provides a ―natural experiment‖ to evaluate the effects of grade retention. 
We  use  information  from  the  PISA  study,  measuring  performance  in  a  standardised  test 
across OECD countries in Maths, Reading and Science at the age of 15. Pupils who have not 
                                                 
2   In the mid-1990s, the Chicago Public Schools declared an end to social promotion (i.e. no grade 
repetition sanctions) and instituted promotional requirements based on standardised test scores.  
3   More precisely in the period 1995-2001 4 
 
repeated a year should then be in grade 10, thus three grades further than the one affected by 
the reform. We are able to compare results before the reform (PISA 2000 and 2003) and after 
the reform (PISA 2006), which is a major advantage in comparison to existing studies. This 
enables us to compare two different ―regimes‖, with and without grade retention.  
 
We first find that the 2001 decision did lead to a statistically significant change in how 15-
year-olds are assigned to grade. The reform led to a reduction of the likelihood of reaching 
grade 10 at the age of 15 (i.e. no grade retention record), and symmetrically, to an increase in 
the likelihood of attending lower grades (i.e. grade 9, 8 or 7).  
 
Compared with many studies, ours also present the advantage of assessing the medium-term 
effects of grade retention. The reform we examine has (exogenously) changed the likelihood 
of grade repetition in grade 7 at the age of 12, and we examine the effect of this reform when 
students are aged 15.  However, since these pupils are still below the compulsory school age, 
we cannot assess the effects of the reform on the final educational achievements.  Comparing 
same-age (retained vs promoted) pupils in the medium run remains problematic, because they 
are by definition in different stages of the curriculum.
4  
 
However, we can nicely test for one necessary condition for grade retention to be justifiable, 
which is that it should at least succeed in filtering out weaker students from passing to higher 
grades. That is, in order to provide any grounds to grade retention, one should at least be able 
to show that, at grade 10, the distribution of score  under a ―grade retention regime‖ is better 
than under a ―social promotion regime‖.
 5  We will show that we find supporting evidence for 
a filtering out effect of the reform. 
 
The data also  allow us  to  compare the attainment  of those filtered out  under the ―grade 
repetition‖ regime vs. the ―social promotion‖ regime. This allow us to shed some light on two 
conflicting trends impacting grade repeaters: i) a (negative) curriculum effect as repeating a 
grade means being exposed to a poorer/less demanding curriculum than the one taught in the 
(higher) reference grade
6; and ii) a  lower-ability/less-demanding  curriculum  (positive) 
                                                 
4   They attend different grades, as can be seen in Table 2 for instance. 
5   Synonymous with no grade-repetition sanctions. 
6   Grade 10 in Belgium at the age of 15. 5 
 
matching effect.  The latter effect directly echoes the argument of the proponents of grade 
repetition: weaker pupils should benefit from being exposed longer to a simpler curriculum 
that better matches their ability and/or attainment. 
  
As to the methodology used in this paper, it is important to stress that the main results are 
based on the synthetic control (SC) method (Abadie, Diamond, Hainmueller, 2007), which 
uses data-driven procedures to construct an adequate comparison group/counterfactual.  In 
practice,  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  single  unexposed  unit  (here  an  educational  system)  that 
approximates  the  most  relevant  characteristics  of  the  French-Speaking  Community  of 
Belgium’s  education  system  and  would  provide  a  counterfactual.    The  idea  behind  the 
synthetic control approach implemented here is that a combination of countries — a synthetic 
control — offers a better comparison than any single country/entity alone (say the Flemish-
Speaking Community of Belgium, France, Germany or the Netherlands). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 is introductory and mainly 
consists  of  stylised  facts.  It  documents  the  international  evidence  on  retention  rates  and 
overall PISA scores. It essentially shows that there is no correlation between cross-country 
variance  in  grade  assignment  of  15  years-olds  and  (1)  their  average  score  and  (2)  the 
dispersion  of  their  scores.  Section  3  presents  the  2001  reform  in  the  French-Speaking 
Community of Belgium and documents its impact on the incidence of grade retention using 
both  administrative  data  and  various  waves  of  the  PISA  survey.    It  then  examines  the 
relationship  between  (more)  grade  retention  and  PISA  scores  in  the  French-Speaking 
Community of Belgium, using the SC method to generate the best possible counterfactual. 
The plausibility of a filtering out assumption is examined first. Second, the paper looks at 
how the score of filtered out students compares under the two regimes. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Grade  assignment  and  grade  retention:  the  international 
evidence 
 
The different OECD countries that participated to the three waves of PISA (2000, 2003, 
2006) provide a relatively large source of variance as to the incidence of grade retention (see 
Annex 1 to 3). Using country-level aggregate data, it is easy, in Figure 1, to see how the share 6 
 
of pupils attending the grade of reference
7 (our proxy for the intensity of grade retention)
8 
relates to score. Figure 1 basically suggests an absence of correlation between the importance 
of grade retention ( i.e.  a  leftward  shift)  and  average  score  in  math.  Similar  results  are 
obtained for reading and science scores. Note incidentally that Figure 2 conveys the same 
information about the relationship between grade retention and standard deviation of PISA 
scores.  
 
However,  country-specific  unknown  factors  may  be  systematically  correlated  with  i)  the 
(varying)  propensity  of  countries  to  resort  to  grade  retention  and  ii)  scores.  Under  these 
circumstances the results of an analysis exploiting the inter-country variance are bound to be 
biased.  
 
This is why it is worth focusing solely on the intra-(or within-) country variance. This is made 
possible by the availability of three consecutive waves of the PISA survey (2000, 2003 and 
2006). Exploiting the country-level panel structure of PISA is thus possible to re-examine the 
relationship we are interested in. Descriptive results are displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
They tend to confirm the absence of relationship between the (within country) evolution of 
score from 2000 to 2006 and the changing proportion of pupils who attend Grade 10 at the 
age of 15.  
 
The descriptive results on display in Figures 4 & 5 are confirmed by the OLS estimation of 
equation [1] (Table 1). The latter uses the same data aggregated at country level. It includes 
country fixed effects to retain the within-country part of the variance.  The list of controls 
includes  a  year  trend  --  that  captures  changes  that  are  common  to  the  whole  group  of 
countries sampled -- and a vector of socio-economic background variables (Table 1). Note 
finally that this model is estimated separately for each of the topics covered by PISA (Math, 
Science and Reading literacy). 
 
                                                 
7   Grade 10 in most countries, grade 9 otherwise. The grade of reference is identified as the most attended 
one among 15 year-olds who participated to PISA. 
8   Of course, differences could also be due to differences in entry school ages. In the case of Belgium, 
except in rare exceptions, pupils enter grade 1 during the calendar year they turn 6. The exact cut-off date is the 
1
st of January.  All the pupils that have reached the age of 6 before that date must start grade 1 during the 
calendar year that ends on the 1
st of January.  7 
 
Yi,t= ʱ + βSREFGi,t + Z’i,t γ + δYEAR +  ηi + εi,t   [1.] 
i= 1,…., J and t=2000, 2003, 2006 
where  
- Yi,t is the average PISA score of country i during year t; 
- SREFGi,t is the share of pupils attending the reference grade
9 in country i during 
year t; 
- YEARt  is the year of observation capturing a trend that would be common to all 
countries ; 
-  Z’i,t    is  a  vector  of  controls  that  include  the  average  parental  socio-economic 
background index and education attainment; 
- ηi is the country i fixed effect ; 
- and εi,t  a random error term centred on zero ; 
 
A  major  limitation  however  is  that  a  within  (country)  restriction,  as  we  imposed  in  the 
previous section (Figure 3 & 4 or equation [1]), could prove insufficient to properly identify 
the  effect  on  scores  of  the  grade-assignment  regime.  Indeed,  changes  observed  within  a 
country over time may be driven by unobserved confounding factors that are correlated with 
scores, like a better economic environment (insufficiently or inadequately captured by the 
observables Z). Thus, ideally the identification of the effects of grade retention requires not 
only an exogenous change in grade repetition, but also the existence of a counterfactual for 
comparison. This is why we now propose an analysis comparing the changes observed in the 
French Community to the changes observed in a control group.  
   
                                                 
9   Grade 10 in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium, like in most of the other countries 
considered here. 8 
 













































































Share of pupils attending reference grade
 
a) Grade 10 in most countries, grade 9 otherwise. The grade of reference is identified as the most attended grade 
among 15 year-olds who participated to PISA. 
ARG : Argentina ; AUS : Australia ; AUT : Austria ; AZE : Azerbaijan ; BFR : French-Speaking Community of 
Belgium; BFL: Flemish-Speaking Community of Belgium; BGR : Bulgaria ; BRA : Brazil; CAN : Canada; 
CHE : Switzerland; CHL : Chile COL : Colombia CZE : Czech Republic; DEU : Germany; DNK : Denmark; 
ESP : Spain EST : Estonia; FIN : Finland; FRA : France; GBR : United Kingdom; GRC : Greece; HKG : Hong 
Kong-China; HRV : Croatia; HUN : Hungary; IDN : Indonesia IRL : Ireland; ISL : Iceland; ISR : Israel; ITA : 
Italy JOR : Jordan; JPN : Japan KGZ : Kyrgyzstan; KOR : Korea LIE : Liechtenstein LTU : Lithuania LUX : 
Luxembourg; LVA : Latvia; MAC : Macao-China; MEX : Mexico; MNE : Montenegro; NLD : Netherlands; 
NOR : Norway; NZL : New Zealand; POL : Poland; PRT : Portugal QAT : Qatar; ROU : Romania; RUS : 
Russian Federation; SRB : Serbia; SVK : Slovak Republic; SVN : Slovenia SWE : Sweden; TAP : Chinese 
Taipei; THA : Thailand TUN : Tunisia; TUR : Turkey; URY : Uruguay; USA : United States. 
Source: PISA 2006 
 9 
 
Figure  2  –  Standard  deviation  of  score  in  math  and  share  of  pupils  aged  15  attending 
reference grade

































































































Share of pupils attending reference grade  
a) Grade 10 in most countries, grade 9 otherwise. The grade of reference is identified as the most attended grade 
among 15 year-olds who participated to PISA. 
Source: PISA 2006 
 
 
Figure 3 – Within country change of the share of age 15 pupils attending reference grade and 




































Change of the share of pupils attending reference grade
 
Source: PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 10 
 
Figure 4 – Within country (statistically significant) change of the share of age 15 pupils 


















































Change of the share of pupils attending reference grade  
Source: PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 




average score  
Country  
standard deviation 
math  read  scie  math  read  scie 
Share of  pupils attending 
reference grade
a  0.15  -0.10  -0.12  -0.23  -0.09  -0.16 
   (-0.460)  (0.792)  (0.575)  (0.003)  (0.469)  (0.038) 
R
2  0.97  0.86  0.92  0.78  0.62  0.74 
N obs  132  129  132  132  129  132 
P-values are between brackets Controls  include  country  fixed effects,  year, average  highest parental  socio-
economic index, average highest degree of father, average highest degree of mother. 
a) Grade 10 in most countries, grade 9 otherwise. The grade of reference is identified as the most attended grade 
among 15 year-olds who participated to PISA. 
Source: PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 11 
 
3. Exploiting the French-Speaking Community reform 
3. 1. The 2001 reform in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium: a 
source of exogenous variation of grade retention 
 
Grade retention/retention and different-grade assignment of same-age pupils have existed for 
a  long  time  in  Belgium,  and  is  particularly  frequent  in  the  French-Speaking  Community 
(Figure 1).
10 The retention decision is based on the teachers’ assessment of the pupil’s ability 
of passing to a higher grade. There is no standardised test used across schools, nor is there a 
clearly defined threshold to determine whether a pupil should be retained or not. All pupils do 
take exams at the end of the school year, for each subject, and the retention decision is made 
after these exams have been taken.  
 
Opponents to grade retention succeeded in 1995 in suppressing grade retention at the end of 
grade 7 (1
st year of secondary education). From 1995 to 2001 no grade retention was allowed 
at the end of grade 7 (1
st year of secondary education), a decision that translated into a sharp 
fall in the number of ―repeaters‖ (Figure 5). During that period, grade retention sanctions 
could only be pronounced at the end of grade 8. Pupils could only possibly repeat grade 7 
upon  agreement  between  parents  and  teachers.  This  is  why  on  Figure  5  one  observes  a 
persistence of grade retention at the end of grade 7 during the 1995-2001 period. 
 
The proponents of grade retention made a successful comeback in September 2001, when the 
decision was taken
11 to re-establish the possibility to retain weak students in grade 7.  In a 
few words, the 2001 reform was such that after the school year 2001-02 it became possible to 
repeat grade 7 or grade 8, although not both.
12  Administrative data (Figure 5) show that the 
                                                 
10   Belgium is a federal state where the educational policy is split according to linguistic lines. Each 
linguistic community is in charge of its educational system. Only minor aspects of the educational policy (like 
the age of compulsory education) remain under federal jurisdiction  
11   Décret relatif à l'organisation du premier degré de l'enseignement secondaire  D. 19-07-2001  M.B. 
23-08-2001 
12   Formally, the legislator insists on the fact that the reform’s aim was not exactly to force the pupils to 
―repeat‖ the year, but to channel weaker students (who did not achieve satisfactory results at the end of grade 7 
or at the end of grade 8) towards a ―complementary‖ year. In practice, however, it amounts to imposing that 
these students take more time before moving to the upper grade. 12 
 
number of pupils repeating grade 7 consequently rose sharply from the school year 2002-03 
onwards.  The same data also show that the total number of students repeating grade 7 or 
grade 8 is substantially higher after 2001, meaning that the 2001 reform generated an overall 
increase of the risk of being retained into a lower grade.   
 
Thus, the 2001 reform enables us to compare a system with grade retention with a system 
with  (almost)  no  grade  retention  in  grade  7.  Hereafter,  we  exploit  the  2001  reform  and 
investigate the medium-term
13 (causal) effects of the reform on the PISA scores.  
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repeating a year




Source: French-Speaking Community of Belgium, Ministry of Education. 
                                                 
13   Remember that we look at age 15 scores to identify the effect of a decision that affected pupils when 
they were aged 12-13. 13 
 
3.2.  Using the Synthetic Control Method to generate a counterfactual 
 
To assess the effects of the reform, we use a synthetic country (SC) as a control (Abadie, 
Diamond, Hainmueller, 2007).  The method generalizes the commonly used difference- in-
difference model. The  SC method a priori  uses  all countries  other than French-Speaking 
Belgium that participated in PISA as potential controls. The key idea is to identify a linear 
combination  of  the  other  i=2  to  J  countries  —  W=(w2,….wJ)  such  that  wi  ≥  0  and 
w2+….+wJ= 1 — that best reproduces the French-Speaking Community of Belgium (i.e. the 
treated entity) during the pre-reform period (i.e. 2000 and 2003), both in terms of average 
attainment  Y  and  a  list  of  observed  controls  Z  that  potentially  affect  attainment.
14  The 
identification of the effect of the reform is achieved by comparing the post -reform observed 
average attainment of pupils in i) the French-Speaking Community of Belgium Y1 and ii) its 
synthetic equivalent YSC=.∑wiYi, i=2 to J. 
 
Annex 1 explains how this is done analytically and why the post-treatment (i.e. 2006) first 
difference between the treated and the synthetic control entities properly identifies the effect 
of  treatment  in  the  presence  of  unobserved  time  effects  and  country  effects  that  are  not 
randomly distributed.  
 
i) PISA Evidence of more grade retention as a consequence of the 2001 
reform 
 
Before turning to the implementation of this evaluation strategy, we need to complement the 
information highlighted in Figure 5 and check that the PISA data used here also contain 
robust  evidence  that  the  reform  has  generated  some  change  in  the  French-Speaking 
community of Belgium in the likelihood of experiencing grade repetition. 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of pupils aged 15 according to their grade in French-Speaking 
Belgium and in the synthetic control entity. We see that in the French-Speaking Community 
                                                 
14   Our  list of controls/predictors include student/teacher ratio, ratio of computers to school size, % of 
teachers with proper certification, mother education, father education, the highest parental socio-economic index 
(HISEI), and the share of pupils attending the reference grade prior to the reform.  14 
 
of Belgium, less pupils aged 15 reached grade 10 in 2006 (i.e. after the reform) than in 2003 
or 2000 (before the 2001 reform), and, symmetrically, that more pupils were below grade 10.  
 
Frequencies reported in Table 2 are direct sign that more grade retention (with lasting effects) 
occurred in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium, as the only way to be at age 15 in 
grade 10 is to have a no-grade-retention record.  In short, all this accords with the grade-
retention regime change introduced in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium in Sept. 
2001.  
 
Table 2 – Share of pupils aged 15 attending grade 10 vs. grade < 10 (%) in the French-
Speaking Community of Belgium 
  French-Speaking Community of Belgium 
2000  0.59  β00 
2003  0.59  β03 
2006  0.55  β06 
Source: Pisa 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 
ii) The screening-out test 
 
Grade retention to be justifiable should at least succeed in filtering out weaker students from 
passing to higher grades. That is, in order to provide any grounds to grade retention, one 
should at least be able to show that, conditional on grade, the distribution of scores under a 
―grade retention regime‖ is on average better than the distribution of scores under a ―social 
promotion regime‖.
15   
 
We will focus  here on  Grade 10  and use the  SC method to  generate  the counterfactual. 
Estimated weights, for each of the models estimated here using the SC method, are reported 
in Annex 9, first Table.   
 
                                                 
15   Those who make it to grade 10 for instance should be, ceteris paribus, better than under the less 
selective regime.  15 
 
Assume that they are (potentially) two categories of students attending grade 10.  First, the 
non-delayed  students,  unaffected
16  by the grade-repetition regime change. These always 
attend grade10 at the age of 15. Let us note their average score  YND
10. The second group 
consists  of  the  0<μ<1  students  directly  affected  by  the  reform  (the  ―treated  students‖ 
hereafter). Their average score in 2006 (in grade10) is YT
10. 
 
Assume further that Y1
10
 is the post-reform observed score average
17 of grade 10 students 





10   [2.] 
 
By comparison, the grade 10 score average in the synthetic French-Speaking Belgium —
estimated  using  the  data-driven  SC  procedure  exposed  above  —  should  be  a  linear 
combination  of  i)  the  score  of  non-delayed/non-treated  students  and  ii)  that  of  ―treated― 
students  (those  who  reached  grade10  at  the  age  of  15  thanks  to  a  less  stringent  grade-
repetition regime before the implementation of the 2001 reform). Note that π — the fraction 
of the cohort that has been ―treated‖ normalised by the size of grade10 in 2006  (β06) to 
properly capture the weight of the treated in the 2006 grade 10 average — can be estimated 





10   [3.] 
where  π= µ/ β06 and μ= β03-β06 as reported in Table 2 
 






10 - π YT
10   [4.] 
 
                                                 
16   We leave aside spillover effects. 
17   All results presented hereafter use students’ average scores (i.e. the unweighted average of their math, 








10)   [5.] 
where π= µ/ β06 
 
The estimation of the left-hand part of expression [5] gives a direct indication of the score 
gap between the treated and the non-treated students. If Y1
10- YSC
10 is significantly positive 
then one can conclude that score of the treated/‖socially promoted‖ students was below those 
who usually attend grade 10 at the age of 15. In that case, it can be inferred that the reform 
properly managed to filter out weaker students (those who presumably could benefit from a 
less demanding curriculum or extra time). 
 
An  important  restriction  is  that  [5]  provides  an  estimate  of  the  π-weighted  relative 
performance of treated students within grade 10.  Hence, it is likely that the 1.71 gap reported 
on the first line of Table 3  underestimates the actual score gap. A short-cut strategy to cope 
with this bias consists of "dividing‖ Y1
10- YSC
10 by π=0.061.  This rapid transformation 
suggests a positive score gap of 28 points.
18  
 
But the 1.71 points estimate on the first line of Table 4 is so uncertain ( i.e. p-value= 0.40) 
that there could be no effect at all, or even a positive one. Further econometric analysis is 
highly desirable to test the plausibility of that result. 
 
Our  strategy  in  that  respect  is  simple.  It  consists  of  incrementally  eliminating  the  upper 
percentiles of the grade 10 distribution of scores (Figure 6) to increase the (relative) weight of 
treated students in the comparison. The crucial assumption is that treated students must be 
concentrated just at the bottom of the grade 10 distribution.  
 








10)   [6.] 
                                                 
18    Pisa scores have an (international) average of 500  and a standard deviation of 100. 17 
 
- θ
  ranging from 90 to 10. 
- π(θ) = µ/ θβ06 assuming all treated pupils belong to the retained percentiles 
 
Results  are  reported  in  Table  3.  They  contain  statistically  significant  evidence
19  that 
YND
10>YT
10  and thus that more grade repetition after the Sept. 2001 reform has primarily 
led to the retention of students who had PISA scores inferior to the grade 10 average. 
 
Figure 6 – Increasing the chances of identifying the sorted-out students: eliminating the upper 







                                                 
19   See Annex 5 for a presentation of inference analysis/hypothesis testing with SC. 
20   The actual score distribution is reported in Annex 6. 18 
 
Table 3 – Grade 10 change of attainment between French-Speaking Belgium and synthetic 





Speaking Belgium  _Y_synthetic  Y_dif  Probt  π  θ  π(θ)=μ/θ  Y_diff/π(θ) 
All obs  541.66  539.93  1.73  0.4084  0.061  1.00  0.061  28.48 
1<=p90  528.76  528.02  0.74  0.5431    0.90  0.068  10.98 
1<=p80  517.50  507.20  10.30***  0.0000    0.80  0.076  135.41 
1<=p70  506.19  502.26  3.93**  0.0200    0.70  0.087  45.21 
1<=p60  494.15  486.87  7.28***  0.0001    0.60  0.101  71.79 
1<=p50  481.38  477.18  4.20**  0.0132    0.50  0.122  34.52 
1<=p40  466.97  456.29  10.68**  0.0000    0.40  0.152  70.21 
1<=p30  449.92  438.77  11.15***  0.0000    0.30  0.203  54.97 
1<=p20  427.71  422.00  5.70**  0.0127    0.20  0.304  18.74 
1<=p10  394.68  397.97  -3.29  0.3477    0.10  0.608  -5.40 
Source: PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1% 
$ Score comparisons for the year 2000 to 2006 for a selection of estimated models are on display in Appendix 7, 
whereas Annex 8 displays the comparison of predictor/control variables. 
iii) How do filtered-out students fare? 
 
Do the filtered out students achieve better/worse when they repeat (and attend a lower grade) 
than when they are ―socially promoted‖ (and attend the reference grade 10)? An answer to 
that  question  can  be  provided  by  comparing  French-Speaking  Belgium’s  overall  (i.e.  all 
grades pooled) score average to its synthetic counterfactual.
21 
 
Assume now that they are three categories of students forming the public of both grade 10 
and grade<10.  First, the non-delayed students, unaffected
22 by the grade repetition regime 
change. These always attend grade10 at the age of 15.  Keep noting their average score 
YND
10.  Another group — also unaffected by the regime change — consists of the delayed 
students always attending grade <10. Their score is noted YD
<10.  The third group consists of 
the μ students directly affected by the reform (again, the ―treated students‖). Their average 
score in grade<10 in 2006 after the reform is YT
<10. 
                                                 
21    The computed weights used to build synthetic controls are presented in Annex 9. 
22   Again, we leave aside spillover effects. 19 
 
 
Assume  further  that  Y1  represents  the  post-treatment  (i.e.  2006)  observed  overall  score 






  [7.] 
with ʱ0+ μ= ʱ  
 
The synthetic counterfactual — corresponding to the case where, due to the absence of the 








  [8.] 
with ʱ0+ μ= ʱ   
 







10)   [9.] 
with 0<μ<<<1.  
 
The first line of Table 4 reports estimates of [9]. They suggest a minor attainment decrease 
(Y_dif) of about -0.29 points which appears totally insignificant from a statistical point of 
view. But again, these results consist of averages that are computed with the scores of all 
pupils. They implicitly (and wrongly) assume that all pupils have been "treated".   
 
Turning back to the frequencies of Table 2, it is more likely that only a small fraction of the 
cohort that has been directly
23 ―treated‖ (μ =β0 – β1=0.586 -0.553= 0.0336): about 3.4%. 
Hence, average-based comparisons of the kind reported in Table 3 — and also in previous 
sections — are unlikely to properly reveal the true magnitude of treatment on those who have 
really been treated.  
 
                                                 
23   We leave aside spillover effects. 20 
 
To cope with this problem, we follow a strategy that is similar to the one used just above. It 
consists of incrementally eliminating the upper (and lower) percentiles of the distribution of 
scores within each grade (Figure 7)
24 to lift the (relative) weight of treated stud ents in the 
averages that are compared with the SC method. The crucial assumption is now  that the 
―treated‖ students must be concentrated above and below the grade<10/grade10 cut-off zone.  
 
Figure 7 – Increasing the chances of identifying the treated students: eliminating upper and 
lower parts of the grade-specific score distribution 
 
Grade10 Grade<10




If for instance one eliminates from the SC computation the students that are above (below) 
the 90-th (10-th) percentile of grade 10 (grade<10) (meaning that we retain  θ=90% of the 
initial overall sample), we should a priori increase the weight of the treated students in the 








10)   [10.] 
where μ(0.9)= μ*1/0.9 assuming all treated pupils belong to the kept percentiles 
 
The second line of Table 4 contains the results when one estimates the left-hand part of [9]. 
They suggest a -1.02 (non-weighted) effect that is not statistically significant. When divided 
                                                 
24   Actual score distribution by grade is in Annexe 5 21 
 
by the weighing factor μ(0.9) the estimate is -27 points, which suggest that the reform has led 
to lower scores for the treated students. But again this result is not statistically significant. 
 
The rest of Table 4 presents our estimates when one eliminates 20%, 30%, 40% … up to 90% 
of the initial sample to focus on the observations concentrated below and above the cut-off 








10)   [11.] 
where μ(θ)= μ*1/θ assuming all treated pupils belong to the retained percentiles 
 
Basically,  results  remain  unchanged.  The  sign  of  the  estimates  change  from  negative  to 
positive. What is more, all estimates are statistically non significant. The tentative conclusion 
is thus that the 2001 reform has had no effect on the score of filtered-out students.  
 
This is not necessarily surprising.  Recall there are two opposite mechanisms which could 
affect the score of students when they are moved from grade 10 to grade<10 (or vice versa): 
First, a (negative) curriculum effect implying that being the grade<10 curriculum is poorer 
than the one taught in grade 10. Second, a  (positive)  ability/curriculum  matching  effect 
implying that the weakest students attending grade 10 before the 2001 reform could be those 
who struggle to grasp the material of a more advanced curriculum, thereby benefiting from 
being retained in grade <10 where there are exposed to a curriculum that better matches their 
capabilities.   
 
Since the reform of 2001 lead to reallocation of pupils from grade 10 to below, one would 
expect a negative difference in means due to a curriculum effect. But our results suggest that 




Table 4 – All grades pooled. Change of attainment between French-Speaking Belgium and 








synthetic  Y_dif  p-value  μ  θ  μ(θ)=μ/θ  Y_diff/μ(θ) 
All obs.  493.40  493.70  -0.29  0.8537  0.034  1  0.034  -8.67 
>p10<=p90  499.97  500.98  -1.02  0.5056    0.9  0.037  -27.18 
>p20<=p80  500.48  497.94  2.54  0.0915    0.8  0.042  60.31 
>p30<=p70  500.59  502.29  -1.70  0.3039    0.7  0.048  -35.33 
>p40<=p60  500.42  503.02  -2.59  0.1583    0.6  0.056  -46.18 
>p50<=p50  500.61  503.51  -2.90  0.1692    0.5  0.067  -43.01 
>p60<=p40  501.34  503.09  -1.75  0.5013    0.4  0.084  -20.81 
>p70<=p30  503.03  504.21  -1.18  0.7101    0.3  0.112  -10.52 
>p80<=p20  507.91  504.32  3.59  0.3660    0.2  0.168  21.34 
>p90<=p10  526.04  515.72  10.32  0.1533    0.1  0.337  30.65 
Source: PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1% 
$ Score comparisons for the year 2000 to 2006 for a selection of estimated models are on display in Appendix 7, 




This paper exploits a reform in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium (re)introducing 
the possibility to impose grade retention at the end of both grade 7 and grade 8, to evaluate 
the effects of grade retention. The reform constitutes a ―natural experiment‖ introducing an 
exogenous  variation  in  the  assignment  of  pupils  to  grade.  Indeed,  the  reform  lead  to  a 
reduction in the likelihood of reaching grade 10 at the age of 15 (i.e. no grade retention 
record), and symmetrically, to an increase in the likelihood of attending lower grades.  
 
Using a synthetic control (SC) method to generate a post-reform French-Speaking-Belgium 
counterfactual we are able to address two issues. First, whether a grade retention regime does 
at least succeed in filtering out weaker students. Second, whether the weaker pupils who end 
up being retained into lower grades under a ―grade repetition regime‖ perform worse/better 
than under a ―social promotion‖ regime. We find statistically significant evidence in support 
of the screening out effect of grade retention. But we fail to demonstrate that filtered out 23 
 
students  perform  differently  under  the  ―grade  repetition‖  regime  than  under  the  ―social 
promotion‖  regime.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  negative  curriculum  effect  repeaters 
traditionally suffer from may have been compensated by a better ability/curriculum match.  
 
A limitation of the paper — that uses same-age score data — is that it cannot assess the 
effects  of  the  reform  on  the  final  educational  achievements.  Comparing  retained  and 
promoted pupils at the age of 15 is problematic, as, by definition, they are in different stages 
of the curriculum. 
 
In  particular  those  who  are  forced  to  repeat  a  grade  and  who  suffer  from  a  negative 
curriculum effect should normally benefit from a richer curriculum when — eventually — 
they get promoted to the higher grade. The long-run balance could then perhaps be that grade 
repetition has a positive effect. However, the proper long-run cost-benefit analysis of grade 
repetition should then also account for the large costs of grade retention, particularly in terms 
of opportunity costs for the pupils (each grade repetition means that one year is lost), but also 
in terms of teaching resources (each grade repetition means one extra year of funding).  
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Annex 1 – PISA 2000, descriptive statistics 
Country Nobs






























Australia 2859 0.92 52.64 4.07 4.09 530.33 529.94 523.43 0.26 16.75 1.07 1.07 89.26 99.58 95.68
Austria 2640 0.50 49.02 3.41 3.49 506.86 508.16 512.59 0.50 14.03 0.95 0.96 89.89 109.02 89.37
Belgium( (Fl) 2211 0.74 48.33 4.33 4.43 546.16 493.55 524.44 0.44 16.29 1.09 1.03 92.95 101.03 87.83
Belgium (Fr) 1573 0.59 50.67 4.05 4.20 493.60 505.25 452.32 0.49 17.21 1.27 1.20 105.10 78.80 115.24
Brazil 2717 0.41 42.77 3.11 3.13 320.05 549.54 388.10 0.49 17.23 1.40 1.43 93.77 82.66 103.52
Canada 16701 0.80 51.27 4.64 4.48 524.98 524.63 515.59 0.40 16.37 0.86 1.00 79.69 94.46 85.38
Switzerland 5456 0.87 47.73 3.41 3.61 531.36 477.07 503.18 0.34 15.37 1.02 1.10 85.23 92.00 95.52
Czech Republic 3066 0.57 48.32 4.13 3.99 499.27 495.16 494.82 0.50 13.70 1.03 1.03 93.16 108.89 101.84
Germany 2830 0.84 49.75 3.60 3.88 500.03 433.52 497.15 0.37 15.80 1.00 1.04 95.81 98.92 96.26
Denmark 2395 0.92 49.82 4.26 3.98 516.02 446.48 492.27 0.27 15.86 1.03 1.06 80.49 109.92 96.58
Spain 3428 0.72 45.02 3.20 3.36 478.79 521.75 491.11 0.45 16.40 1.38 1.42 84.85 82.15 90.61
Finland 2703 0.89 50.07 3.68 3.48 537.03 405.06 527.14 0.31 16.40 1.19 1.15 74.56 101.55 86.99
France 3861 0.60 47.89 3.94 3.84 523.24 504.78 497.60 0.49 17.79 1.15 1.15 87.23 92.90 93.72
United Kingdom 54627 0.54 44.34 4.06 3.74 519.82 494.52 526.15 0.50 18.51 1.01 1.11 107.19 97.29 110.34
Greece 2605 0.95 47.89 3.84 3.79 446.42 491.02 472.65 0.21 18.07 1.30 1.31 100.67 93.20 91.77
Hungary 3491 0.95 48.57 4.17 3.92 492.52 490.00 506.26 0.22 15.77 1.01 1.01 88.02 86.80 92.92
Ireland 2128 0.96 48.23 4.03 3.72 502.92 510.17 512.89 0.19 15.22 1.23 1.31 78.77 88.76 94.95
Iceland 6424 1.00 54.11 3.83 3.93 526.54 518.18 521.76 0.07 15.38 1.24 1.20 78.24 90.72 80.15
Italy 4413 0.83 46.79 3.84 3.82 460.25 492.97 481.98 0.38 15.49 1.16 1.14 82.82 87.12 94.86
Japan 2940 1.00 50.37 560.07 528.00 522.15 0.00 15.49 81.13 83.42 98.35
Korea 2769 0.99 42.41 3.65 3.85 541.47 505.93 526.14 0.11 14.24 1.24 1.22 79.79 93.79 87.89
Liechtenstein 175 0.81 46.73 3.15 3.66 513.85 522.41 451.99 0.39 15.31 0.81 1.11 91.63 87.40 94.75
Luxembourg 4483 0.79 43.84 3.34 3.51 442.23 481.94 487.94 0.41 17.55 1.41 1.41 84.11 101.81 93.19
Latvia 2719 0.51 48.83 4.73 4.61 451.53 490.40 444.13 0.50 18.19 0.73 0.87 100.27 98.91 98.92
Mexico 2567 0.56 43.22 2.78 3.03 394.19 540.09 454.30 0.50 17.10 1.33 1.40 78.28 89.78 88.49
Netherlands 1382 0.48 51.59 3.76 3.98 573.72 538.46 508.79 0.50 16.28 1.19 1.18 84.05 88.56 96.62
Norway 2307 0.98 53.95 4.20 4.14 498.75 488.76 507.14 0.13 15.32 1.10 1.11 87.08 101.65 93.61
New Zealand 2048 0.92 52.09 4.02 3.97 536.51 508.79 522.00 0.27 16.90 1.12 1.15 94.52 98.96 96.17
Poland 1976 1.00 44.72 4.25 4.02 460.09 487.21 474.39 0.00 15.09 0.97 1.01 96.19 94.25 91.66
Portugal 2545 0.55 44.59 3.14 3.19 458.85 489.84 463.23 0.50 16.09 1.26 1.29 85.61 94.61 88.79
Russian Federation 3719 0.73 49.72 4.80 4.69 478.71 493.53 464.20 0.44 17.05 0.62 0.75 98.14 97.59 90.91
Sweden 2464 0.97 50.38 4.40 4.29 509.90 504.44 501.87 0.17 16.16 0.99 1.05 88.61 83.09 89.80






































Australia 12551 0.91 52.61 3.49 3.54 522.33 523.85 522.78 0.28 16.04 1.38 1.37 94.01 93.16 98.19
Austria 4597 0.52 47.42 3.25 3.65 511.86 497.09 497.37 0.50 16.08 1.03 1.14 88.47 94.67 90.21
Belgium( (Fl) 5059 0.73 50.81 3.59 3.65 552.56 528.99 528.02 0.45 16.76 1.36 1.33 101.97 94.44 93.88
Belgium (Fr) 3737 0.59 50.56 3.72 3.70 506.97 486.94 490.24 0.49 16.85 1.46 1.43 101.17 102.22 100.22
Brazil 4452 0.66 40.53 2.80 2.83 360.41 406.90 393.06 0.47 15.96 1.78 1.79 91.67 97.37 85.53
Canada 27953 0.80 50.75 3.83 3.65 521.40 516.18 508.65 0.40 15.97 1.17 1.25 84.03 84.49 92.66
Switzerland 8420 0.83 48.09 3.02 3.39 518.24 491.76 502.81 0.38 15.83 1.26 1.38 91.50 86.07 96.61
Czech Republic 6320 0.54 51.62 3.36 3.46 534.95 505.64 541.17 0.50 14.72 0.88 0.91 95.58 88.83 96.23
Germany 4660 0.82 49.60 3.08 3.41 508.41 497.12 508.23 0.39 16.26 1.32 1.43 97.16 100.74 103.44
Denmark 4218 0.91 49.13 3.76 3.51 513.69 491.32 474.54 0.29 15.48 1.34 1.29 87.10 81.02 93.98
Spain 10791 0.74 44.92 2.81 2.95 494.78 489.91 490.43 0.44 16.84 1.64 1.70 82.15 86.52 89.55
Finland 5796 0.87 50.76 3.92 3.70 542.81 541.60 544.49 0.33 16.93 1.33 1.43 79.50 73.65 83.32
France 4300 0.63 49.02 3.17 3.25 514.73 500.04 515.89 0.48 16.74 1.33 1.35 87.03 88.77 101.88
United Kingdom 9535 0.84 49.54 3.48 3.32 514.44 512.24 519.38 0.36 16.56 1.24 1.29 88.08 87.81 97.03
Greece 4627 0.90 46.38 3.02 3.10 440.88 468.10 477.49 0.30 16.86 1.38 1.50 89.83 95.80 90.87
Hong Kong-China 4478 0.60 41.16 1.95 2.16 555.86 513.87 544.61 0.49 13.44 1.24 1.28 94.18 76.87 85.75
Hungary 4765 0.92 48.33 3.33 3.35 488.59 480.66 501.54 0.28 15.26 1.05 0.96 89.66 84.97 89.84
Indonesia 10761 0.87 35.14 2.03 2.38 361.51 383.97 397.19 0.34 18.16 1.51 1.55 73.05 64.99 56.94
Ireland 3880 0.97 48.49 3.22 3.10 504.68 517.21 507.12 0.17 15.81 1.29 1.40 81.76 81.51 86.68
Iceland 3350 1.00 53.63 3.14 3.33 515.05 491.78 494.79 0.00 16.72 1.27 1.21 86.39 91.13 88.31
Italy 11639 0.84 47.54 3.04 3.04 496.00 500.99 515.11 0.37 16.29 1.27 1.27 89.79 90.84 96.56
Japan 4707 1.00 49.84 3.78 3.67 533.51 497.36 546.98 0.00 14.74 1.21 1.34 96.71 98.60 102.43
Korea 5444 0.99 46.09 2.94 3.33 540.60 532.85 536.84 0.12 13.45 1.33 1.41 89.23 76.91 93.98
Liechtenstein 332 0.79 50.80 2.90 3.51 536.46 525.66 525.81 0.41 14.97 1.21 1.36 95.28 83.80 96.65
Luxembourg 3923 0.85 48.18 3.22 3.42 493.48 479.78 483.07 0.36 16.60 1.71 1.62 88.01 93.51 96.07
Latvia 4627 0.81 50.74 4.09 3.95 486.17 493.02 491.39 0.39 16.52 1.04 1.07 83.35 82.24 84.33
Macao-China 1250 0.56 39.88 1.80 1.92 522.79 493.66 521.21 0.50 12.64 1.32 1.28 84.57 64.51 81.35
Mexico 29983 0.76 41.73 2.25 2.51 405.40 421.72 421.79 0.43 18.76 1.73 1.77 74.47 77.67 72.07
Netherlands 3992 0.51 51.48 3.17 3.46 542.12 516.89 528.71 0.50 15.87 1.35 1.43 89.80 80.60 93.86
Norway 4064 0.99 54.68 3.88 3.85 495.64 499.68 484.63 0.08 15.38 1.17 1.20 88.35 95.18 95.94
New Zealand 4511 0.93 51.62 3.44 3.26 525.62 523.40 523.03 0.25 16.41 1.38 1.37 95.03 98.82 97.74
Poland 4383 0.96 44.77 3.23 3.12 489.00 495.19 496.26 0.19 14.87 0.90 0.98 86.42 88.88 94.04
Portugal 4608 0.64 42.95 2.05 2.06 465.23 476.10 466.71 0.48 15.98 1.82 1.77 83.98 86.68 86.26
Russian Federation 5974 0.70 50.22 3.67 3.59 472.44 446.89 493.71 0.46 16.76 0.97 0.95 88.04 83.10 88.95
Slovak Republic 7346 0.62 49.60 3.29 3.38 504.12 475.22 501.58 0.48 16.21 0.89 0.93 88.91 84.69 92.89
Sweden 4624 0.97 50.71 3.83 3.57 507.95 513.12 505.00 0.16 16.16 1.35 1.44 90.97 89.01 98.30
Thailand 5236 0.57 37.19 1.86 1.99 422.73 426.33 435.52 0.50 16.20 1.39 1.39 80.80 72.73 75.58
Tunisia 4721 0.38 37.49 1.46 2.06 359.34 375.24 385.33 0.49 17.80 1.45 1.49 77.24 84.58 76.00
Turkey 4855 0.94 41.90 1.63 2.36 426.72 443.52 436.14 0.24 15.33 1.39 1.53 97.81 84.79 85.89
Uruguay 5835 0.58 46.10 3.03 2.98 412.99 422.68 429.23 0.49 18.17 1.72 1.72 99.08 116.26 101.95
United States 5456 0.68 54.19 3.62 3.53 481.47 494.09 490.01 0.47 16.38 1.19 1.22 90.38 94.29 93.96
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Country Nobs






























Argentina 4339 0.71 45.98 2.88 2.72 388.12 383.93 398.33 0.45 16.95 1.87 1.84 90.14 110.10 92.48
Australia 14170 0.91 52.97 3.55 3.50 516.26 508.69 523.13 0.29 16.40 1.31 1.34 85.86 92.75 99.70
Austria 4927 0.52 48.13 3.39 3.77 509.51 493.95 513.86 0.50 16.60 1.09 1.18 91.52 101.68 93.29
Azerbaijan 5184 0.94 50.32 3.77 3.95 476.76 354.98 385.35 0.23 18.71 1.20 1.25 44.35 66.03 53.27
Belgium( (Fl) 5124 0.75 49.80 3.73 3.67 545.82 524.34 531.35 0.44 16.26 1.32 1.32 93.18 98.87 88.91
Belgium (Fr) 3733 0.55 50.62 3.64 3.66 500.99 483.55 495.68 0.50 17.01 1.43 1.43 97.97 102.14 98.50
Bulgaria 4498 0.96 48.03 3.48 3.38 417.41 406.83 439.05 0.21 16.26 1.11 1.02 93.71 109.81 100.77
Brazil 9295 0.59 42.52 2.56 2.45 365.57 389.18 385.25 0.49 18.42 1.82 1.85 87.27 94.26 85.97
Canada 22646 0.84 52.60 3.99 3.76 517.42 512.32 522.52 0.37 15.75 1.18 1.26 82.21 95.24 92.37
Switzerland 12192 0.84 48.53 3.18 3.52 528.29 496.60 508.02 0.36 15.84 1.35 1.44 90.62 87.57 93.68
Chile 5233 0.78 41.27 2.82 2.91 417.08 447.86 443.11 0.41 16.76 1.49 1.50 82.41 94.79 87.38
Colombia 4478 0.61 43.04 2.61 2.69 373.83 390.31 391.86 0.49 17.36 1.90 1.94 82.77 96.91 80.85
Czech Republic 5932 0.50 50.76 3.52 3.55 536.03 509.64 537.61 0.50 14.70 0.99 0.99 103.75 108.19 99.67
Germany 4891 0.84 49.19 3.25 3.50 504.32 496.53 516.21 0.37 16.35 1.27 1.34 95.49 107.99 97.09
Denmark 4532 0.89 49.25 3.91 3.64 512.23 493.80 494.72 0.32 17.10 1.32 1.29 80.01 84.90 89.69
Spain 19604 0.69 46.32 2.94 2.99 501.65 479.52 504.51 0.46 17.34 1.52 1.58 83.89 82.58 84.08
Estonia 4865 0.73 50.81 3.82 3.66 516.77 502.38 533.73 0.45 16.56 1.05 1.08 75.96 81.39 80.32
Finland 4714 0.89 48.87 4.19 3.91 548.99 547.08 563.38 0.31 16.98 1.29 1.43 76.38 76.77 82.19
France 4716 0.60 48.78 3.24 3.25 496.43 488.66 496.12 0.49 16.60 1.32 1.37 91.38 98.95 98.24
United Kingdom 13152 0.97 50.06 3.69 3.52 497.27 495.64 514.27 0.18 16.23 1.19 1.25 84.01 96.01 102.80
Greece 4873 0.95 48.92 3.24 3.27 462.04 461.91 476.64 0.21 16.82 1.37 1.47 86.51 97.01 87.94
Hong Kong-China 4645 0.64 42.77 2.16 2.26 551.39 538.95 546.09 0.48 13.57 1.27 1.34 88.43 76.99 87.43
Croatia 5213 1.00 46.65 3.46 3.52 467.32 477.55 493.65 0.03 15.09 1.12 1.09 79.02 84.93 82.26
Hungary 4490 0.96 48.20 3.41 3.37 496.18 488.10 508.72 0.20 15.16 1.09 1.02 85.38 87.53 83.67
Indonesia 10647 0.89 37.96 1.98 2.28 380.69 383.92 384.76 0.32 15.66 1.46 1.51 69.47 64.73 59.36
Ireland 4585 0.97 49.22 3.40 3.29 502.34 518.65 509.49 0.16 16.37 1.27 1.36 77.67 87.34 90.86
Iceland 3789 1.00 54.01 3.33 3.51 505.59 484.99 490.95 0.04 16.99 1.38 1.31 83.64 92.19 93.50
Israel 4584 0.86 53.27 3.88 3.94 443.32 441.30 455.63 0.35 15.99 1.35 1.36 102.41 113.34 107.85
Italy 21773 0.82 46.38 2.91 2.89 473.63 477.01 487.15 0.38 16.32 1.14 1.17 92.29 102.63 93.27
Jordan 6509 0.92 51.71 3.02 3.32 389.18 409.49 427.10 0.28 17.19 1.64 1.63 75.92 85.85 83.72
Japan 5952 1.00 50.35 3.91 3.96 525.55 500.21 533.72 0.00 14.70 1.06 1.10 86.29 96.87 96.05
Kyrgyzstan 5904 0.93 47.09 4.22 4.27 315.90 290.54 326.33 0.26 18.02 1.15 1.12 80.05 94.27 77.78
Korea 5176 0.99 49.99 3.26 3.60 547.17 556.06 521.92 0.10 13.42 1.15 1.26 88.78 84.79 87.02
Liechtenstein 339 0.83 51.16 3.13 3.58 524.86 510.74 522.25 0.37 15.50 1.27 1.41 88.50 91.50 94.20
Lithuania 4744 0.88 49.59 3.99 3.70 485.61 469.33 486.52 0.33 17.87 1.05 1.06 85.35 91.38 87.00
Luxembourg 4567 0.88 47.69 2.94 3.15 490.49 480.07 486.85 0.33 16.62 1.77 1.69 88.86 95.43 93.60
Latvia 4719 0.82 49.34 3.87 3.64 491.24 484.86 493.78 0.38 16.63 1.07 1.06 77.00 84.48 80.31
Macao-China 4760 0.37 41.91 1.84 1.99 524.41 490.64 509.46 0.48 13.93 1.30 1.30 79.68 72.31 75.56
Mexico 30971 0.78 43.58 2.43 2.66 420.70 427.36 422.64 0.42 18.57 1.78 1.83 72.03 81.48 71.97
Montenegro 4455 1.00 48.89 3.83 3.93 395.84 388.23 408.79 0.04 16.14 1.21 1.16 79.63 84.98 75.79
Netherlands 4871 0.51 52.05 3.41 3.59 537.41 513.91 530.76 0.50 15.68 1.37 1.39 83.69 90.09 91.00
Norway 4692 0.99 53.11 4.00 3.90 489.84 484.37 486.93 0.07 15.34 1.17 1.21 86.71 99.50 91.99
New Zealand 4823 0.94 51.79 3.60 3.46 523.77 522.74 532.68 0.24 15.97 1.38 1.33 88.49 99.79 103.74
Poland 5547 0.97 45.32 3.25 3.18 500.95 512.63 503.29 0.18 15.33 0.84 0.79 84.35 95.36 87.82
Portugal 5109 0.54 42.01 2.01 1.93 470.94 476.84 478.97 0.50 16.30 1.78 1.76 85.43 93.14 84.17
Qatar 6265 0.77 61.67 3.24 3.60 317.74 312.51 349.08 0.42 12.97 1.79 1.65 83.61 101.25 78.49
Romania 5118 0.95 43.39 3.65 3.65 414.97 391.97 416.61 0.22 16.25 1.22 1.18 79.79 88.77 77.84
Russian Federation 5799 0.66 51.33 3.65 3.54 478.66 442.37 481.50 0.47 17.09 0.97 0.96 84.46 85.79 85.86
Serbia 4798 0.99 48.51 3.56 3.64 436.64 402.86 436.93 0.10 16.28 1.18 1.15 86.28 86.04 80.93
Slovak Republic 4731 0.61 47.50 3.34 3.36 495.10 470.55 491.22 0.49 15.80 0.89 0.91 89.62 98.83 89.57
Slovenia 6595 0.99 47.83 3.29 3.23 482.21 468.58 494.19 0.08 15.71 1.07 1.00 84.70 88.96 93.79
Sweden 4443 0.98 50.70 4.03 3.74 503.23 508.99 504.23 0.14 15.86 1.29 1.40 85.46 93.35 91.31
Chinese Taipei 8815 0.69 49.55 2.80 2.97 562.75 506.68 543.71 0.46 15.91 1.00 1.11 94.56 76.92 88.44
Thailand 6192 0.67 38.90 1.90 2.07 425.47 425.19 429.73 0.47 16.65 1.47 1.50 81.29 78.79 79.22
Tunisia 4640 0.49 37.85 1.84 2.43 363.91 378.96 384.19 0.50 18.74 1.60 1.63 85.47 87.79 77.22
Turkey 4942 0.57 39.83 1.55 2.22 428.25 452.92 427.61 0.50 15.47 1.27 1.45 89.33 83.21 79.55
Uruguay 4839 0.70 45.82 3.14 3.02 435.47 424.68 437.68 0.46 18.66 1.81 1.84 93.53 111.99 91.32
United States 5611 0.88 52.46 3.78 3.67 474.72 488.29 0.32 16.78 1.28 1.31 85.46 102.37
Mean Standard deviation28 
 
Annex 4 – Synthetic control as an indentifying strategy 
 
Suppose we observe i=1 to J educational systems during T periods. Suppose that the first one (i.e. the 
French-Speaking Community of Belgium) is exposed to the intervention/policy change of interest in time T0.  
Let Yi,t be the outcome that could be observed for system i at time t  
Yi,t= δt + ʱit Dit + υit  [1] 
υit ≡ Ziθt  + λtμi + εit 
with Dit=1 if i=1 and t>T0 and Dit=0 otherwise, where δt  is a common time period effect, Zi is a vector of 
observed covariates that potentially influence the outcome, μi is an unobserved system-specific effect, λt is 
an unknown common factor, and εit are unobserved transitory shocks at the system level with zero mean for 
all.  
We aim at estimating for t>T0 (i.e. after the intervention) 
ʱ1t= Y1t – Y
N
1t 
Because Y1t is observed, we only need to estimate its counterfactual Y
N
1t. 
Consider a (Jx1) vector of weights W=(w2,….wJ ) such that wi≥0 and w2+….+wJ=1.  Each particular vector 
W represents a potential synthetic control (SC), that is, a particular weighted average of control systems. 
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or equivalently, exploiting the fact that ∑
J
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1ks(εis - ε1s) 29 
 
  [5] 
In addition (for any t),  
∑
J




2wi Zi –Z1)θt + (∑
J
2wi μi- μ1)λt+ ∑
J
2wi(εit - ε1t)  [6] 
Suppose that we choose W







1=0  and ∑
J
2w*i Zi –Z1=0 
Then, the left-hand term of [5] as well as the first term of the right-hand part of [5] and [6] disappear. What 
is more, if ∑
T0
1ksλs ≠0, we obtain from [5] that 
∑
J






1ks(εis - ε1s)  [7] 
Hence [6] becomes a function of the random error terms ε exclusively, with an expected value equal to zero 
∑
J
2(w*i Yit) - Y
N






1ks(εis - ε1s) + ∑
J
2wi(εit - ε1t)  [8] 
Therefore, for t>T0 we have that ∑
J
2(w*i Yit) equates the (unobserved) counterfactual Y
N
1t. Hence,  
ʱ1t= Y1t - ∑
J
2(w*i Yit)  
The computation of W* is done by minimizing the pseudo-distance || X1 – XSCW|| subject to the condition 




1,) is the vector of pre-treatment characteristics that 




1  i.e. linear combinations of the PISA scores.  The similar 
vector for the non-treated countries is XSC.  
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Annex 5 – Inference analysis with Synthetic control 
Unlike Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2007) we have access to individual data within each country. 
Like them, we run the Stata synth procedure, using data aggregated at the country level (Y, Z). This explains 
that we rely on (numerous) individual data to do hypothesis testing and computed the results reported in 
Tables 3 and 4.  
The statistics we aim at are standard t-tests gauging the plausibility that two means (the post-treatment for 





1/2  [1] 
with Var
2 the pooled sample standard deviation equal to 
Var
2= Var
1 (N1-1) + Var
SC(NSC-1)/(N1+ NSC-2) 
where S
1 is the standard deviation characterising the treated entity post treatment (here the French Speaking 
Community of Belgium in 2006) and Var
SC the standard deviation characterizing its synthetic equivalent. It 
is important to stress how the latter is computed.  
Assume we have N1,N2… NJ students j in each of the J countries that participated to PISA, with N1 
designating the sample size for the treated country (i.e. the French-Speaking Community of Belgium).  
The synthetic control score for the post-treatment period computed by the STATA code developed by  
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2007) uses country-level averages Yi =1/Ni ∑
Ni
1=1Yil. The delivered score 








1=1Yil)   [2] 
The point is that the latter can be replicated using individual/disaggregated data by i) applying the estimated 
weights W* to the entire sample N
$=N2+… + NJ of individuals forming the synthetic control entity (w*i Yij) 









1 θ*i Yil) with θ*i≡N
$/Ni  w*i  [3] 
It is immediate to show that [3] is equal to [2]. What is more, the same weighing strategy can be used to 







1 (θ*i Yij - Y
SCR)
2  [4]-31 
 
Annex 6 – Pisa score distribution by grade (on the vertical axis, 0= below grade 10 and  1= grade 10,) 
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Annex 7 –  PISA average score
25 in 2000, 2003 (before treatment) vs 2006 (after treatment). 
Comparison between the French-Speaking Community Belgium and its synthetic control. 
Grade 10 only Grade 10 (<70 th perc)










































French-Speaking Belgium synthetic control
                                                 
25   Country/entity averages, based on individual unweighted average score in math, science and reading PISA scores. 33 
 
Annex 8 –  Control/predictor variables 
26. Comparison between the French-Speaking Community Belgium and its synthetic control (all grades 
pooled). 
  Synthetic control (all grades pooled)  French-Speaking Community of Belgium 






















































2000  0.63  13.90  0.09  0.81  48.92  4.41  4.31  0.59  10.06  0.07  0.77  50.67  4.05  4.20 
2003  0.67  12.61  0.10  0.90  50.40  3.51  3.50  0.59  10.14  0.09  0.86  50.56  3.72  3.70 





                                                 
26   Country/entity averages, based on individual unweighted average score in math, science and reading PISA scores. 34 
 
Annex 9 – Country weights forming the synthetic French-Speaking Community of Belgium.  
   Analysis of Grade 10 scores 
Country  all data  <=p10  <=p20  <=p30  <=p40  <=p50  <=p60  <=p70  <=p80  <=p90 
AUS                     
AUT                  0.140   
BFL  0.253          0.455  0.330  0.439  0.116  0.138 
BRA                     
CAN                     
CHE                     
CZE  0.526              0.244    0.763 
DEU                     
DNK                     
ESP                     
FIN                     
FRA      0.346    0.491    0.240    0.260   
GBR                     
GRC                     
HUN                     
IRL                     
ISL            0.100         
ITA                     
JPN                     
KOR                     
LIE        0.850    0.210         
LUX                     
LVA  0.221  0.124  0.444  0.570  0.451  0.331  0.430  0.318  0.479  0.100 
MEX                     
NLD    0.226  0.140  0.480  0.580  0.400      0.366   
NOR                     
NZL                     
POL                     
PRT    0.425  0.700               
RUS    0.226                 
SWE                     
USA                               


























AUS                     
AUT                     
BFL                     
BRA                     
CAN                     
CHE                     
CZE  0.330  0.363  0.386  0.481  0.533  0.532  0.534  0.510  0.438  0.345 
DEU                     
DNK                     
ESP                     
FIN                     
FRA                     
GBR                     
GRC                     
HUN                     
IRL                     
ISL  0.270  0.300  0.250  0.290             
ITA                     
JPN                     
KOR                     
LIE                     
LUX          0.280  0.280         
LVA  0.169  0.231  0.323  0.235  0.580  0.184  0.990  0.500  0.500   
MEX          0.100           
NLD  0.210  0.500  0.460  0.300        0.220  0.530   
NOR                     
NZL                     
POL                     
PRT  0.670  0.530  0.600  0.610  0.170  0.650  0.590  0.670  0.190  0.584 
RUS  0.386  0.299  0.160  0.192  0.364  0.191  0.380  0.359  0.349  0.710 
SWE                     
USA                               
Sum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
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